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OPINION OF THE COURT
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
We confront here the interplay between the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(the “Convention”), adopted June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 3, and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C.
§ 1 et seq.  We also address the propriety of sanctions awarded
in the related litigation.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm
the judgments of the District Court confirming the arbitration
award and denying one of the requested Rule 11 sanctions, but
we reverse its judgment awarding the other Rule 11 sanction.
I. Factual and Procedural History
A. The reinsurance treaties
Two Pennsylvania insurers, Legion Insurance Company
and Villanova Insurance Company (collectively, the “primary
     1 Reinsurance treaties are a type of reinsurance contract.  A
treaty reinsurer agrees to accept and insure an entire block of
insurance business (both existing policies and “as yet unwritten”
policies).  Instead of assessing the individual, existing risks
being reinsured, the reinsurer evaluates the overall risk of the
pool that is to be reinsured as the policies are written.  Thus, any
representations by the primary insurer about the pool of risks are
material to the reinsurer’s decision to reinsure the block of
business.
This is in contrast to facultative reinsurance, where a
reinsurer assesses the characteristics of each policy to determine
whether to reinsure the individual risks as presented.  See
generally N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194,
1198–1200 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining the difference between
treaty reinsurance and facultative reinsurance).
     2 The reinsurers are a Lloyd’s syndicate that underwrote
insurance and reinsurance business in London, England.  The
individuals comprising the syndicate predominantly live abroad,
largely within the United Kingdom.
     3 Outside of this section, we refer to the primary insurers and
the Commissioner collectively as “Ario” when addressing their
5
insurers”), entered into reinsurance treaties1 with the
Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyd’s for the 1998
Year of Account (the “reinsurers”).2  The primary insurers are
now in liquidation, and they are represented in these actions by
their statutory liquidator, Joel S. Ario, the Insurance
Commissioner for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.3
arguments.
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Four reinsurance treaties are at issue here, all with
identical language in the relevant provisions, differing only in
the limits and types of coverage provided.  The first relevant
provision governs arbitration, and it is reproduced here in its
entirety:
ARBITRATION
As a condition precedent to any right of action
hereunder, any dispute or difference between the
[primary insurers] and the Reinsurers relating to
the interpretation or performance of this
Agreement, including its formation or validity, or
any transaction under this Agreement, whether
arising before or after termination, shall be
submitted to binding arbitration, with the
exception of matters requiring resolution by way
of injunctive relief.
Upon written request of any party, each party
shall choose an arbitrator and the two chosen shall
select a third arbitrator.  If either party refuses or
neglects to appoint an arbitrator within thirty (30)
days after receipt of the written request for
arbitration, the requesting party may appoint a
second arbitrator.  If the two arbitrators fail to
7agree on the selection of a third arbitrator within
thirty (30) days of their appointment, each of
them shall name three individuals, of whom the
other shall decline two, and the selection of the
third arbitrator from those remaining named
individuals shall be named by the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
All arbitrators shall be disinterested in the
outcome of the arbitration.  Each party shall
submit its case to the arbitrators within thirty (30)
days of the appointment of the third arbitrator.
The parties hereby waive all objections to the
method of selection of the third arbitrator, it being
the intention of both sides that the third arbitrator
be chosen from those submitted by the parties.
The arbitrators shall have the power to determine
all procedural rules for the holding of the
arbitration[,] including but not limited to
inspection of documents, examination of
witnesses[,] and any other matter relating to the
conduct of the arbitration.  The arbitrators shall
interpret this Agreement as an honorable
engagement and not as merely a legal obligation,
they are relieved of all judicial formalities and
may abstain from following the strict rules of law.
The arbitrators may award interest and costs, but
in no event shall punitive or exemplary damages
8be awarded.  Each party shall bear the expense of
its own arbitrator and shall share equally with the
other party the expense of the third arbitrator and
of the arbitration.
Arbitration hereunder shall take place in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania unless both parties
otherwise agree.  Except as hereinabove provided,
the arbitration shall be in accordance with the
rules and procedures established by the Uniform
Arbitration Act as enacted in Pennsylvania.
J.A. 141, 156, 173, 187.  The second relevant provision is the
service-of-suit provision, reproduced in part below:
SERVICE OF SUIT CLAUSE (USA) - NMA
1998
It is agreed that in the event of the failure of
Reinsurers hereon to pay any amount claimed to
be due hereunder, the Reinsurer hereon, at the
request of the Reinsured, will submit to the
jurisdiction of a Court of competent jurisdiction
within the United States.  Nothing in this Clause
constitutes or should be understood to constitute
a waiver of Reinsurers’ rights to commence an
action in any Court of competent jurisdiction in
the United States, to remove an action to a United
States District Court, or to seek a transfer of a
9case to another Court as permitted by the laws of
the United States or of any State in the United
States.
J.A. 142, 156, 173, 188.
B. The coverage dispute and arbitration
Years after the reinsurance treaties were signed, a dispute
arose between the primary insurers and the reinsurers.  The
reinsurers asserted that the primary insurers were not
underwriting the business as described in the initial placement
materials (i.e., the pool risks were not what the reinsurers
expected them to be based on the primary insurers’ prior
representations).  The reinsurers alleged that the primary
insurers underwrote their business in a manner that, while
increasing premium volume for the primary insurers, also
exposed the reinsurers to increased risk.  A September 2005
audit by the reinsurers purportedly exposed these problems.
The reinsurers argued that they had suffered substantial
losses as a result of the primary insurers’ misconduct, and they
refused to pay the claims of the primary insurers.  The primary
insurers responded by demanding arbitration on September 18,
2006, in the hope of recovering their share of losses under the
reinsurance treaties (i.e., what the primary insurers believed was
owed to them by the reinsurers under the treaties).
The parties agreed that the dispute was arbitrable, and
     4 The eight theories were: (1) material misrepresentation
under English law; (2) material non-disclosure under English
law; (3) breach of the duty of utmost good faith under English
law; (4) intentional misrepresentation or omission under
Pennsylvania law; (5) negligent misrepresentation or omission
under Pennsylvania law; (6) breach of the duty of utmost good
faith under Pennsylvania law; (7) breach of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing under Pennsylvania law; and (8)
breach of contract under Pennsylvania law.
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they proceeded to arbitration.  The primary insurers asked the
arbitration panel to award it the full amount due under the
reinsurance treaties, plus interest.  The reinsurers argued that the
treaties should be rescinded (and thus, their obligations to pay
the primary insurers extinguished) based on eight separate legal
theories.4  The primary insurers denied the contentions.  Broad
discovery was conducted, resulting in document production,
depositions, and expert reports; the parties submitted briefs; and
a nine-day evidentiary hearing was held in which both parties
made opening and closing statements, and thoroughly examined
and cross-examined 11 witnesses.
The testimony of one witness in particular, Ian Crane,
though only a small part of the arbitration proceedings, factors
prominently in our case.  Crane was an employee of the
managing agent for the reinsurers, and he participated in the
underwriting of the treaties at issue here.  He testified to the
circumstances under which he received the placement materials
from the primary insurers and the effect of those materials on
     5 These three documents are: (1) a submission from the
primary insurer to prospective reinsurers about how the primary
insurer was to underwrite the business to be ceded to the
reinsurers; (2) a marked-up October 1998 fax to a reinsurer
about how the primary insurer allocated premiums; and (3) a
November 1998 fax to Mr. Crane explaining differences
between the reinsurance treaties at issue in this case and other
reinsurance contracts not at issue here.
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underwriting.  However, he did not specifically recall the precise
communications between the primary insurer and the reinsurers,
and he did not recall his exact knowledge and thoughts at the
time of the reinsurance underwriting.  Instead, he based his
testimony on documents (including three documents that are not
part of or cited in the reinsurance treaties, but are
communications between the primary insurers and the reinsurers
and their agents)5 that he saw years ago during the placement
process.
Following the discovery, briefing, and evidentiary
hearing, the arbitration panel issued an award rescinding three
of the four treaties.  On the rescinded treaties, the reinsurers
were relieved of any obligation to pay losses owing; on the
remaining treaty, the reinsurers were ordered to pay losses
owing.  This award was a so-called unreasoned award, as the
panel neither provided the rationale for its decision nor gave any
indication of the evidence on which its decision was based.
     6 The removal provision reads:
Where the subject matter of an action or
proceeding pending in a State court relates to an
arbitration agreement or award falling under the
Convention, the defendant or the defendants may,
at any time before the trial thereof, remove such
action or proceeding to the district court of the
United States for the district and division
embracing the place where the action or
proceeding is pending.  The procedure for
removal of causes otherwise provided by law
shall apply, except that the ground for removal
provided in this section need not appear on the
face of the complaint but may be shown in the
petition for removal.  For the purposes of Chapter
1 of this title any action or proceeding removed
under this section shall be deemed to have been
12
C. Post-arbitration litigation
The primary insurers have been in liquidation
proceedings in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania since
mid-2003.  Following the arbitration award, on August 6, 2008,
Ario (as liquidator on behalf of the primary insurers) filed a
motion to confirm in part, and to vacate in part, the award as
part of the liquidation proceedings.  Shortly thereafter, the
reinsurers removed the case to the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania pursuant to the removal provision in 9
U.S.C. § 205,6 and filed a motion to confirm the award.  The
brought in the district court to which it is
removed. 
9 U.S.C. § 205.
     7 To clarify, the Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA are
distinct.  The Convention is the multilateral treaty to which the
United States acceded.  Chapter 2 of the FAA is the
implementing legislation for the Convention, and it provides the
mechanism for enforcement of the Convention in United States
courts.  See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (“The Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of
June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in
accordance with this chapter.”).
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parties do not dispute that the award falls under the Convention;
they part on whether the FAA and Convention’s enabling
legislation contained in Chapter 2 of the FAA applies (including
9 U.S.C. § 205).7  See 9 U.S.C. § 202; Standard Bent Glass
Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 449 & n.13 (3d Cir.
2003) (listing four factors to determine whether an arbitration
agreement falls under the Convention).
On September 29, 2009, Ario filed a motion to remand
the case to state court, which the reinsurers opposed.  Ario’s
motion was premised on the argument that the parties had
selected the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act (“PUAA”),
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7301 et seq., to govern the arbitration.
Therefore, he argued, the parties had opted out of the FAA in its
entirety (including 9 U.S.C. § 205), and the District Court
14
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  That Court denied the motion
to remand in a five-page opinion, “easily conclud[ing]” that it
had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to § 205 because the case
related to an arbitration award falling under the Convention.  It
reasoned that (1) the authority cited by Ario did not address the
Court’s jurisdiction, and (2) Ario had “not even attempt[ed] to
address why [it] lack[ed] jurisdiction under the real test for
making that determination.”
Having failed in his attempt to remand the case, Ario
continued to pursue his motion to vacate the award (in
opposition to the reinsurers’ motion to confirm the award).  He
argued that the parties had opted out of FAA vacatur standards
in favor of the standards set forth by the PUAA.  Applying his
interpretation of the PUAA vacatur standards, he urged that the
award be vacated based on perceived weaknesses in Mr. Crane’s
testimony and other documentary evidence.  The District Court
denied Ario’s motion to vacate the award and granted the
reinsurers’ motion.  It concluded that review was governed by
the FAA, not the PUAA.  Applying the FAA and confirming the
award, it rejected Ario’s contention that there was “no evidence”
to support the award.
Following the District Court’s rulings, the reinsurers
moved for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 against Ario and his counsel, Pepper Hamilton, for both (1)
the motion to remand, and (2) the motion to vacate the award.
The District Court granted the motion in part and denied it in
part.  Finding “no basis in existing law for [Ario] to assert there
15
was no jurisdiction,” and noting that Ario did not argue that “he
was trying under Rule 11(b)(2) to extend or modify existing law,
or create new law,” the Court decided that the imposition of
attorney’s fees was an appropriate sanction.  It also determined
that the Rule 11 sanction would fall on Ario’s attorneys alone
(and not on Ario).  However, the District Court did not find a
Rule 11 violation on account of the filings contesting the
arbitration award because, in the Court’s view, it was “legally
and objectively reasonable” for Ario to challenge the award on
the basis that Mr. Crane had no personal recollection of the
circumstances leading up to the reinsurance agreements.
These consolidated cross-appeals followed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review
As we explain below, the District Court had jurisdiction
under 9 U.S.C. §§ 203 and 205.  We have jurisdiction over the
consolidated appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We exercise plenary review over the denial of a motion
to remand to the extent that the underlying basis is a legal
question, as it is here.  Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d
661, 665 (3d Cir. 2002).  In reviewing a district court’s order
confirming an arbitration award, we assess its factual findings
for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.  China
Minmetals Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 278
(3d Cir. 2003).
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We review a district court’s decision to grant or deny
Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion.  Simmerman v.
Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 61 (3d Cir. 1994).  This means “we evaluate
the court’s factual determinations, legal conclusions, and choice
of an ‘appropriate sanction’ with substantial deference,
considering not whether we would make the same precise
determinations, but only whether those determinations are
contrary to reason or without a reasonable basis in law and fact.”
Id. at 62.  An example of abuse of discretion occurs when a
district court “base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law
or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”  Id.
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Removal to federal court was proper under 9
U.S.C. § 205
While Ario agrees that the award is subject to the
Convention, he argues that the parties “agreed to waive Chapter
2 of the FAA [the Convention’s implementing legislation] in its
entirety,” precluding removal of this case to federal court.
Citing to Supreme Court and Third Circuit cases, his argument
essentially has two prongs: (1) the parties can (and did) “opt
out” of the entire FAA such that they are not subject to its
strictures; and (2) even if the FAA applies, the arbitration
provisions here included a clear and unequivocal expression of
intent to opt out of the removal provision in § 205.  We disagree.
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1. Parties cannot “opt out” of the FAA and
the Convention’s implementing
legislation
Ario argues that the language in the reinsurance treaties
referencing the PUAA supplanted the FAA in its entirety.  But
though the FAA allows parties to choose state-law arbitration
standards, they cannot “opt out” of the FAA.  Accordingly, the
parties here could not have “opted out” of the FAA,
notwithstanding language that refers to the PUAA in the
reinsurance treaties.
The FAA is divided into three chapters, two of which are
implicated here.  Chapter 1 (the “domestic FAA”), 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1–16, is a set of default rules “designed ‘to overrule the
judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to
arbitrate.’”  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989).  Chapter 2 (the
Convention’s implementing legislation), 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–08, by
contrast, is intended “‘to secure for United States citizens
predictable enforcement by foreign governments of certain
arbitral contracts and awards made in this and other signatory
nations.’”  Suter v. Munich Reins. Co., 223 F.3d 150, 154 (3d
Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
The domestic FAA “simply requires courts to enforce
privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts,
in accordance with their terms.”  Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 (citations
omitted).  It “does not . . . prevent[] the enforcement of
18
agreements to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth
in the [domestic FAA] itself.”  Id. at 479.  Thus, when “parties
have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing those
rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent
with the goals of the FAA.”  Id.
We have interpreted the FAA and Volt to mean that
“parties [may] contract to arbitrate pursuant to arbitration rules
or procedures borrowed from state law, [and] the federal policy
is satisfied so long as their agreement is enforced.”  Roadway
Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2001)
(citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 478), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576,
583 n.5 (2008).
This is not because the agreements “cease being subject
to the FAA,” but is instead because “the FAA permits parties to
‘specify by contract the rules under which . . . arbitration will be
conducted.’”  Id. (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).  Thus,
enforcement of an agreement to use state rules and procedures
in lieu of the federal default rules is “not because the parties
have chosen to be governed by state rather than federal law,” but
“because federal law requires that the court enforce the terms of
the agreement.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  But while parties
may opt out of the FAA’s default rules, they cannot “opt out” of
FAA coverage in its entirety because it is the FAA itself that
authorizes parties to choose different rules in the first place.
Although Volt and Roadway addressed only the domestic
19
FAA, the principles undergirding those decisions apply to the
Convention’s implementing legislation.  An agreement by
parties to apply the rules and procedures of state law neither
operates as an “opt out” of the domestic FAA nor as an “opt
out” of the Convention’s implementing legislation.  It is federal
law that allows the parties to make and enforce agreements that
fall under the FAA or the Convention.  Accordingly, we reject
Ario’s argument that the FAA, in its entirety, is inapplicable
here.
2. The parties did not clearly and
unambiguously agree to waive the right
of removal
Though the parties may not opt out of (and are governed
by) the FAA, it is still possible to waive specifically the right of
removal under 9 U.S.C. § 205.  See Suter, 223 F.3d at 158.
Though not discussed by the parties or the District Court in the
prior proceedings, on appeal the parties acknowledge controlling
precedent on the question of whether a right of removal under
§ 205 may be waived by agreement of the parties.  In Suter, we
noted the “strong and clear preference for a federal forum, a
policy that will be best served by resolving any ambiguity in
contract language against waiver” of the right of removal.  Id.
We therefore applied a strict standard, holding that “there can be
no waiver of a right to remove under the Convention Act [i.e.,
9 U.S.C. § 205] in the absence of clear and unambiguous
language requiring such a waiver.”  Id.
     8 There were three separate opinions in Ensco, with the two
members of the majority applying different reasoning to reach
the same result.  See Ensco, 579 F.3d at 443 (Smith, J.); id. at
449 (Owen, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 450 (Jolly, J.,
dissenting).
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Suter involved a service-of-suit provision in which a
party had agreed to “submit to the jurisdiction of any Court of
competent jurisdiction within the United States.”  Id. at 153.
We held that provision to be ambiguous with respect to the
question of a § 205 waiver because the “service of suit clause
does not explicitly waive removal rights, and a defendant may
remove a case ‘after submitting to the jurisdiction of [the state]
courts and complying with all necessary requirements to give
[the state] courts power over the suit,’ as required by the service
of suit clause.”  Id. at 160 (alterations in original) (citation
omitted).  Indeed, because “‘[a]ll matters would be determined
in accordance with the practice and law of the court chosen by
[the plaintiff] in the sense that all state courts follow the removal
law established by Congress,’” the right of removal was
consistent with the contractual language.  Id. (alterations in
original) (citation omitted).  
We are aware of only one decision from our sister circuit
courts that has found a clear and unambiguous waiver of the
right to remove pursuant to § 205.  See Ensco Int’l, Inc. v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 579 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009).
There, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit8 held that a choice-of-law provision in an insurance
21
policy met the clear and unambiguous standard where the parties
agreed that “[a]ny disputes arising under or in connection with
[the insurance policy] shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Courts of Dallas County, Texas.”  Id. at 443
(emphasis added).  The judges in the majority each found the
words “exclusive jurisdiction” to be sufficiently express, clear,
and unambiguous to be a waiver of § 205 rights.  Id. at 448–49
(Smith, J.); id. at 450 (Owen, J., concurring in the judgment).
Any other interpretation would “read the word ‘exclusive’ out
of the contract,” id. at 449 (Smith, J.), and ignore the “well-
understood” meaning of “exclusive,” id. at 450 (Owen, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
Ario contends that there is similar “clear and
unambiguous” language in the reinsurance treaties’ arbitration
provisions expressing the parties’ agreement to waive the right
of removal.  He argues that because the parties agreed that “the
arbitration shall be in accordance with the rules and procedures
established by the [PUAA],” this waived the reinsurers’ (and
Ario’s) right to remove to federal court under § 205.
We disagree that this was sufficiently clear and
unambiguous to effect a waiver.  Not only do the arbitration
provisions not make any mention of removal, the lone provision
in the reinsurance treaties to refer to removal, the service-of-suit
provision, explicitly states that “[n]othing in [it] constitutes or
should be understood to constitute a waiver of Reinsurers’ rights
. . . to remove an action to a United States District Court.”  Nor
is there any language akin to “exclusive jurisdiction” that is
22
fundamentally incompatible with the preservation of the right to
remove.  Far from expressing a clear and unambiguous waiver
of the right to remove, the reinsurance treaties expressly
preserve it.
To the extent that Ario argues that this language
disavows removal only with respect to anything else in the
service-of-suit provision (and not the entire agreement), we
disagree.  It would be self-defeating, to say the least, for the
reinsurers to preserve expressly in one provision what Ario
argues they waived implicitly in another.  We do not read the
agreement to reach that illogical result.  We conclude that the
parties did not agree to waive their § 205 rights, and thus affirm
the District Court’s denial of the motion to remand.
B. The FAA provides the applicable vacatur
standards
The parties disagree as to the applicable vacatur
standards.  Ario argues that the PUAA applies, while the
reinsurers argue that the FAA applies.  We agree with the
reinsurers.
Though this award falls under the Convention, which
ordinarily provides extremely limited grounds for vacatur, the
FAA provides the applicable (and slightly broader) vacatur
standards for this award.  We conduct our analysis in two steps:
first, we explain why the FAA vacatur standards presumptively
apply to Convention awards rendered and enforced in the United
     9 Article V reads as follows:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award
may be refused, at the request of the party
against whom it is invoked, only if that
party furnishes the competent authority
where the recognition and enforcement is
sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement
referred to in article II were, under
the law applicable to them, under
some incapacity, or the said
23
States; and second, we determine that the reinsurance treaties do
not show the parties’ clear intent to substitute the PUAA vacatur
standards for those of the FAA.
1. In the absence of clear intent to the
contrary, the FAA’s vacatur standards
apply to a Convention award rendered
and enforced in the United States
“Under the Convention, a district court’s role is
limited—it must confirm the award unless one of the grounds
for refusal specified in the Convention applies to the underlying
award.”  Admart AG v. Stephen & Mary Birch Found., 457 F.3d
302, 307 (3d Cir. 2006); see also 9 U.S.C. § 207.  Article V of
the Convention sets forth the grounds for refusal,9 and “courts
agreement is not valid under the
law to which the parties have
subjected it or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law of
the country where the award was
made; or
(b) The party against whom the award
is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the
arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference
not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission
to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to
arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separate from
those not so submitted, that part of
the award which contains decisions
on matters submitted to arbitration
may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral
authority or the arbitral procedure
24
was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing
such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the
country where the arbitration took
place; or
(e) The award has not yet become
binding on the parties, or has been
set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country
in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought
finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference
is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that
country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of
the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
25
Arbitral Awards art. V, adopted June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517,
330 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Admart AG, 457 F.3d at 307–08.
26
have strictly applied the Article V defenses and generally
view[ed] them narrowly.”  Admart AG, 457 F.3d at 308.
Accordingly, if vacatur is limited to the grounds listed in the
Convention, Ario would have little chance of success.  We have
recognized, however, that there is “more flexibility . . . when the
arbitration site and the site of the confirmation proceeding were
within the same jurisdiction.”  Id. (citing Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim
& Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 22–23 (2d Cir.
1997)).
In Yusuf, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
concluded that there are “very different regimes for the review
of arbitral awards (1) in the [country] in which, or under the law
of which, the award was made, and (2) in other [countries]
where recognition and enforcement are sought.”  126 F.3d at 23.
After conducting a thorough analysis of both regimes, it
concluded that the FAA’s vacatur standards applied to the
Convention award it was reviewing because the arbitration
award was made in the United States.  Id.
We previously adopted the second portion of Yusuf in
Admart AG, “‘holding that, in an action to confirm an award
rendered in, or under the law of, a foreign jurisdiction, the
grounds for relief enumerated in Article V of the Convention are
the only grounds available for setting aside an arbitral award.’”
     10 A “nondomestic” award is an award that is “subject to the
Convention not because [it was] made abroad, but because [it
was] made within the legal framework of another country, e.g.,
pronounced in accordance with foreign law or involving parties
domiciled or having their principal place of business outside the
enforcing jurisdiction.”  Yusuf, 126 F.3d at 19 (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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457 F.3d at 308 (quoting Yusuf, 126 F.3d at 20).  We therefore
looked only to the limited Article V grounds when reviewing a
“foreign” Convention award.  But unlike Admart AG, in this
case the Convention award was rendered in the United States.
Therefore, we must decide whether to adopt the first portion of
the Yusuf decision and its articulation of the available grounds
for vacating a Convention award rendered in the United States.
The Yusuf Court held that, “under Article V(1)(e) [of the
Convention], the courts of the United States are authorized to
apply United States procedural arbitral law, i.e., the [domestic]
FAA, to nondomestic [Convention] awards rendered in the
United States.”10  126 F.3d at 19–20; see also Convention Art.
V(1)(e) (“Recognition and enforcement of the award may be
refused . . . [if the award] has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.”).  Accordingly, the Yusuf Court
concluded, “[t]he Convention specifically contemplates that the
[country] in which, or under the law of which, the award is
made, will be free to set aside or modify an award in accordance
with its domestic arbitral law and its full panoply of express and
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implied grounds for relief.”  126 F.3d at 23.  We agree with this
interpretation, and now adopt it.
This reasoning is also consistent with 9 U.S.C. § 208,
also part of the Convention’s implementing statute, in which
Congress explicitly provided for the application of the domestic
FAA to the extent that it did not conflict with the Convention.
See 9 U.S.C. § 208 (“Chapter 1 [of the FAA] applies to actions
and proceedings brought under this chapter to the extent that
chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention as
ratified by the United States.”).  When both the arbitration and
the enforcement of an award falling under the Convention occur
in the United States, there is no conflict between the Convention
and the domestic FAA because Article V(1)(e) of the
Convention incorporates the domestic FAA and allows awards
to be “set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which . . . that award was made.”  Here, because the
arbitration took place in Philadelphia, and the enforcement
action was also brought in Philadelphia, we may apply United
States law, including the domestic FAA and its vacatur
standards.
2. There was no clear intent to apply the
PUAA vacatur standards
As discussed above, the domestic FAA allows parties to
agree to apply state law enforcement mechanisms in lieu of the
FAA default rules.  Of course, “[t]he FAA is not the only way
into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards,” and
     11 Ario argues that Hall Street supports his position.  We
disagree.  In Hall Street the Supreme Court addressed only the
narrow question of whether parties could agree to modify the
FAA’s confirmation, vacatur, and modification standards (listed
in 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10 and 11), concluding that they “provide
exclusive regimes for the review provided by statute,” and thus
could not be altered by the parties.  552 U.S. at 590.  However,
the Court noted that it “sp[oke] only to the scope of the
expeditious judicial review under [those sections], [and]
decid[ed] nothing about other possible avenues for judicial
enforcement of arbitration awards.”  Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, Hall Street says nothing about using the alternate avenue
of 9 U.S.C. § 205 for judicial enforcement of an arbitration
award falling under the Convention, and does not support Ario’s
arguments that the FAA is entirely displaced.
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parties “may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or
common law.”  Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 590.11  “[T]he FAA
standards control ‘in the absence of contractual intent to the
contrary.’”  Roadway, 257 F.3d at 296 (quoting Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59 (1995)).
We require the parties to express a “clear intent” to apply
state law vacatur standards instead of those of the FAA.  See id.
at 288, 293, 295.  We chose the “clear intent” standard because
it furthered the FAA’s goal of enforcing parties’ actual bargains,
and we concluded that the default application of the FAA caused
fewer problems than application of other standards in the
absence of “clear intent.”  Id. at 296 (“We must, therefore,
decide which error is worse: wrongly concluding that parties
     12 The suggested language in Roadway, however, did not
represent magic words.  257 F.3d at 297 n.5 (“We do not mean
to suggest that parties may not be found to have opted out unless
their contract includes a statement such as this one.  We only
hold that a generic choice-of-law clause, standing alone, raises
no such inference.”).
     13 Importantly, there is no requirement that a party wishing to
remain under the FAA vacatur standards affirmatively express
that intent, as in Roadway we presumed that the parties intended
not to opt out of the FAA standards.  257 F.3d at 297.
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intended to opt out, or wrongly concluding that they did not.  In
light of the FAA’s history, we believe that the former is worse
than the latter.”).  Thus, the parties here must show “clear
intent” to apply the PUAA vacatur standards in order to displace
those of the FAA.  We also noted in a dictum that “[i]t is not
particularly difficult, for example, to provide that ‘any
controversy shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the [PUAA].’”12  Id. at 297.  We observed that this
would impose “minuscule transaction costs.”13  Id. 
In applying the “clear intent” standard, we look to the
reinsurance treaties to determine what the parties actually agreed
to use as the vacatur standards.  Again, of particular importance
are the arbitration provisions and the service-of-suit provision.
We conclude that while there is a plausible argument that the
parties may have agreed to apply PUAA standards, it falls short
of the “clear intent” we demand.
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Ario relies on language in the reinsurance treaties that
resembles language we suggested (in the Roadway dictum noted
above) might satisfy the “clear intent” standard: “the arbitration
shall be in accordance with the rules and procedures established
by the [PUAA].”  J.A. 141, 156, 173, 187.  Standing alone, this
might suggest that the parties agreed to use the PUAA vacatur
standards.  However, this is not the only sentence in the
arbitration provisions of, nor does it contradict other sentences
in, the reinsurance treaties relating to the enforcement of any
resulting award.
For example, the reinsurance treaties contain a service-
of-suit provision.  As we recently observed, “service-of-suit
[provisions] . . . complement arbitration clauses by establishing
a judicial forum in which a party may enforce arbitration.”
Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London,
584 F.3d 513, 554 (3d Cir. 2009).  The reinsurers contend that
the service-of-suit provision here is “the only provision to
address judicial enforcement of the parties’ rights.”  (Reinsurers’
Br. at 26 (emphasis in original).)  While we may not agree that
it is the only such provision, it does specifically refer to
enforcement of the arbitration award in state and federal courts.
See J.A. 142, 156, 173, 188 (“[I]n the event of the failure of
Reinsurers hereon to pay any amount claimed to be due
hereunder, the Reinsurer . . . will submit to the jurisdiction of a
Court of competent jurisdiction within the United States.”).
This provision does not contain any reference to the operative
law, but it does address enforcement of any arbitration award by
“establishing a judicial forum” for enforcement.  Of importance
     14 Although our colleague has written a thoughtful dissent,
we believe he has read too much into the arbitration provision
by appending the end of the last sentence of the fifth paragraph
of the five-paragraph arbitration provision to the middle of the
first sentence of the first paragraph of that provision.  However,
the term “rules and procedures” does not modify “any dispute
or difference,” but instead modifies “arbitration.”  See J.A. 141,
156, 173, 187 (“[T]he arbitration shall be in accordance with
the rules and procedures established by the [PUAA].” (emphasis
added)).  As we have stated, there is a difference between the
conduct of an arbitration proceeding and the enforcement of a
resulting award.
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is that it also does not affirmatively elect to apply PUAA vacatur
standards in that forum.
By contrast, the arbitration provisions on which Ario
relies strongly imply that they are concerned with only the
conduct of the arbitration itself, not judicial enforcement of a
resulting award.  The five paragraphs of arbitration provisions
go into great detail as to the scope of the arbitrators’ power, the
selection of the arbitrators, the procedural rules for conducting
the arbitration, an “honorable engagement” section casting aside
judicial formalities, limits to the types of damages, and the site
of arbitration.  Reading the last paragraph of the arbitration
provisions in this context leads us in the majority to conclude
that they address solely the “rules and procedures” applicable to
the conduct of the arbitration, not its enforcement (i.e., the
applicable vacatur standards).14
The structure of the PUAA reflects this dichotomy
between the arbitration and the resulting award.  Sections
7305–12 of the PUAA address the “rules and procedures” for
the conduct of arbitration, including: the selection of arbitrators;
the quorum of arbitrators; the conduct of the arbitration
proceeding; the representation of parties by attorneys in the
arbitration proceeding; the presentation of witnesses, subpoenas,
oaths, and depositions in the arbitration proceeding; the form of
the award of the arbitrators; the power of arbitrators to change
their award; and the fees and expenses of the arbitration
proceeding.  Each of these sections is concerned with the nuts-
and-bolts of the arbitration, not ex post enforcement of the
resulting award.
By contrast, as made plain by the PUAA, “a court . . .
review[s] an arbitration award,” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7302(d)(2)
(emphasis added), but it does not conduct the arbitration.
Sections 7313–20 of the PUAA address the role of the court in
reviewing the award that results from an arbitration proceeding,
including: confirmation of an award by a court; vacating an
award by a court; modifying or correcting an award by a court;
judgments or decrees on an award by a court; the form and
service of applications to a court; the meaning of “court” and
“jurisdiction”; the venue of court proceedings; and appeals from
court orders.  Each of these sections is concerned not with the
out-of-court arbitration, but instead with the in-court
confirmation, vacatur, or modification of a resulting award. 
We presume the parties knew what they were doing
when they chose the word “arbitration” and not “award,” and
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we conclude that, by speaking only to “the arbitration,” the
parties here did not clearly intend to apply PUAA vacatur
standards to the resulting award.  Simply put, vacatur is not
arbitration.
We also disagree strongly that we are allowing a service-
of-suit provision to override what our colleague believes to be
the “wholesale adoption . . . of the PUAA.”  In Century
Indemnity, we did indeed state that “service-of-suit clauses do
not negate accompanying arbitration clauses.”  584 F.3d at 554.
However, this was not in the context of selecting vacatur
standards—it dealt with whether the dispute was arbitrable at
all.  See id. (“Century also argues that the . . . service-of-suit
clause indicates that disputes between the parties should be
resolved exclusively in the courts.”).  Here, we have not negated
an agreement to arbitrate; quite the contrary, we actually enforce
the arbitration award.  We hold only that the parties here did not
clearly intend to apply PUAA vacatur standards to the resulting
award.
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As previously stated, we err on the side of concluding
that parties do not intend to opt out of the FAA scheme.  In the
face of the reasonable inferences that (1) the arbitration
provisions were concerned solely with the conduct of the
arbitration itself, and (2) the service-of-suit provision was
concerned with judicial enforcement of any arbitration decision,
we believe that the parties did not have a “clear intent” to apply
the PUAA vacatur standards in lieu of the FAA standards.  We
thus apply the FAA’s vacatur standards and not those of the
PUAA.
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C. The award is confirmable under the FAA
vacatur standards
Ario argues that, even if the FAA vacatur standards
apply, the arbitration panel had no ground on which to base its
interpretation of the reinsurance treaties and “exceeded [its]
powers.”  Because Mr. Crane did not personally recall the
negotiations that led to the underwriting, Ario argues, the
arbitration award must be vacated because it is “irrational.”
Applying the FAA’s vacatur standards, we disagree and affirm
the District Court’s judgment confirming the award.
1. The FAA vacatur standards
Vacatur under the FAA is governed by 9 U.S.C. § 10.  If
the FAA’s vacatur standards apply, as they do here, these are the
only grounds that can support vacatur.  See Hall St., 552 U.S. at
590.  Four narrow grounds are provided in the statute:
In any of the following cases the United States
court in and for the district wherein the award was
made may make an order vacating the award upon
the application of any party to the arbitration—
(1) where the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
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them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
The sole basis Ario asserts for vacation of the award is
“irrationality,” and he makes no contention of any corruption,
fraud, partiality, or misconduct (the first three grounds).  The
“irrationality” standard comes from the fourth ground, the
“exceeded their powers” provision.  See Mut. Fire, Marine &
Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reins. Co., 868 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir.
1989) (noting that the “court’s function in confirming or
vacating a commercial [arbitration] award is severely limited”
and interpreting what is now § 10(a)(4) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  We
review the form of the relief awarded by the arbitrators to
     15 Ario is apparently referring to the communications
between the primary insurers and the reinsurers (and their
agents).
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“determine if the form of the arbitrators’ award can be rationally
derived either from the agreement between the parties or from
the parties[’] submissions to the arbitrators,” and we do not
revise the terms of the award “unless they are ‘completely
irrational.’”  Id. (citation omitted).
So deferential is the “irrationality” standard under the
FAA that we “may not overrule an arbitrator simply because
[we] disagree . . . .  [T]here must be absolutely no support at all
in the record justifying the arbitrator’s determinations for a court
to deny enforcement of an award.”  United Transp. Union Local
1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir.
1995) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It
“should be clear that the test used to probe the validity of a[n]
. . . arbitrator’s decision is a singularly undemanding one.”  Id.
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Conversely, Ario faces a steep uphill battle to show that the
arbitration award rendered here was completely irrational and
could not be supported on any theory of relief.
2. Vacatur is not warranted
Ario contends that the award must be vacated because
Mr. Crane’s testimony and the reinsurers’ other “immaterial”
documentary evidence15 qualify only as “non-evidence.”
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(Appellant’s Br. at 59.)  Notably, he does not argue that there
was an actual lack of testimony or evidence, but claims that “it
was as if [the reinsurers] had no witness at all to support [their]
defense[s]” in response to each of the eight theories they offer
(and Ario must disprove) to justify the arbitration award.  (Id.)
In essence, Ario’s arguments express discontent with the
weighing of evidence by the arbitration panel.  Their premise is
that the evidence uncovered during discovery (including
documents, deposition transcripts, and expert reports), the
testimony and argument presented to the arbitrators during a
nine-day evidentiary hearing, and the substantial briefing
submitted by both parties, were not sufficient to justify the
award.  Yet Ario has not demonstrated why that voluminous
record before the arbitration panel could not rationally lead to
the arbitration award on any of the eight theories advanced by
the reinsurers; instead, he focuses solely on whether the
evidence should have been given any weight at all.
As a reviewing court, we do not act to “correct factual or
legal errors made by an arbitrator,” and we will uphold an award
even if the arbitrator engaged in “improvident, even silly,
factfinding,” Major League Umpires Ass’n v. Am. League of
Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)), so long as the arbitrator did not act
“completely irrational[ly],” Mut. Fire, 868 F.2d at 56 (internal
quotation marks omitted).  While Ario may find the evidence
unpersuasive, we cannot say that the arbitration panel was
     16 Pepper Hamilton also argues that, because the District
Court imposed sanctions after it had already issued a final
judgment, the sanctions must be reversed in light of the
supervisory rule we announced in Pensiero.  See Mary Ann
Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 99–100 (3d Cir. 1988)
(“[W]e adopt as a supervisory rule for the courts in the Third
Circuit a requirement that all motions requesting Rule 11
sanctions be filed in the district court before the entry of a final
judgment.”); see also Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d
195, 202 (3d Cir. 2008) (“An obvious corollary to requiring
parties to file their Rule 11 motion prior to final judgment, . . .
is that district courts must resolve any issues about imposition
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“completely irrational” in crediting the testimony of Mr. Crane
and the other documents presented to the panel that Ario
considers to be “non-evidence.”  Accordingly, we affirm the
District Court’s confirmation of the arbitration award.
D. Rule 11 sanctions were not warranted
We conclude with the parties’ cross-appeals regarding
Rule 11 sanctions entered against Pepper Hamilton, Ario’s
counsel.  As stated above, the District Court imposed sanctions
against the firm for its motion to remand, but declined to impose
sanctions for its motion to vacate.  Because sanctions were not
warranted for the filing of either motion, we reverse the award
of sanctions for contesting jurisdiction in the motion to remand,
and we affirm the denial of sanctions for the motion to vacate
the award.16
of sanctions prior to, or contemporaneously with, entering final
judgment.  Requiring Rule 11 motions to be filed before final
judgment is entered accomplishes nothing unless we are able to
resolve any challenge to the grant or denial of Rule 11 sanctions
when we rule on the merits of the final judgment.”).  Because
we reverse the sanctions on the merits, we do not reach this
issue.
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Rule 11 provides that attorneys may be sanctioned if
they, among other things, fail to make a reasonable inquiry into
the legal legitimacy of a pleading.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) &
(c).  A district court must determine whether the attorney’s
conduct was “objectively reasonable under the circumstances.”
Simmerman, 27 F.3d at 62.  Sanctions are to be applied only “in
the ‘exceptional circumstance’ where a claim or motion is
patently unmeritorious or frivolous.”  Doering v. Union County
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted).  Rule 11’s “primary purpose is not ‘wholesale
fee shifting but [rather] correction of litigation abuse.’”  Id.
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).  It “must not be used
as an automatic penalty against an attorney or party advocating
the losing side of a dispute,” and it “should not be applied to
adventuresome, though responsible, lawyering which advocates
creative legal theories.”  Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847
F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
The District Court granted the motion for Rule 11
sanctions based on Ario’s motion to remand, in which he argued
that because the Volt and Roadway decisions allow parties to
     17 As discussed above, this is incorrect.  Though neither the
parties nor the District Court cited to it in that Court’s
proceedings, we made clear in Suter that parties to an arbitration
agreement may indeed agree to an enforcement regime that
waives removal to federal court under § 205.  223 F.3d at 158.
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choose the applicable law (and thus opt out of portions of the
FAA), by choosing the PUAA the parties had opted out of § 205
as well, divesting the Court of jurisdiction.  The District Court
found a Rule 11 violation because it believed the cases cited by
Ario were “clearly distinguishable,” as they did not address
jurisdiction or the Convention, only the domestic FAA.  In
imposing sanctions, the Court found Ario’s argument “that the
parties’ choice of law . . . divested the court of jurisdiction” had
“simply no basis in existing law” and was “clearly without
merit,” though it did not identify any authority to the contrary.
J.A. 53–54.  It apparently believed that parties could not opt out
of § 205 and waive their right to a federal forum.17
While the District Court may have distinguished Volt and
Roadway or considered them not on point, that does not make an
argument premised on those cases sanctionable under Rule 11.
Nothing in those cases expressly forecloses Ario’s argument,
and though ultimately unpersuasive, it was not “patently
unmeritorious or frivolous.”  With Volt and Roadway as the only
two pole stars for its decision (and in the absence of directly
contrary authority), there was equally no basis in existing law
for the Court to conclude that parties could not opt out of § 205
and divest a federal court of jurisdiction.  As noted, Rule 11
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sanctions are reserved for correcting litigation abuse.  This was
not such an instance.  Though we affirm the District Court’s
denial of the motion to remand, we reverse its decision to grant
Rule 11 sanctions for the motion to remand, as the motion to
remand was not patently lacking in merit.
The District Court did not award Rule 11 sanctions based
on the motion to vacate the award.  While we ultimately
disagree with Ario’s assertion that the PUAA applies here
because the language in the reinsurance treaties did not state a
clear intent to do so, his argument was not “patently
unmeritorious or frivolous.”  As discussed above, under the
FAA parties can indeed opt to apply state vacatur standards
instead of federal standards.  Likewise, although Ario faced a
difficult burden to demonstrate that the award was “completely
irrational” under the FAA vacatur standards, the failure to do so
does not detract from his non-frivolous argument that the award
should be vacated under the PUAA.  Viewing the District
Court’s determinations “with substantial deference” (as we
must), Simmerman, 27 F.3d at 62, it did not abuse its discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm its decision not to award sanctions for
the motion to vacate.
*    *    *    *    *
We affirm the District Court’s denial of the motion to
remand, its denial of the motion to vacate, and its denial of the
motion for sanctions for the filing of the motion to vacate the
award.  We reverse its grant of the motion for sanctions for the
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filing of the motion to remand.
1Joel S. Ario v. The Underwriting Members of 
Syndicate 53 at Lloyd's
Nos. 09-1921/1922/2989/2990/2991/2992
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.
I am pleased to join Judge Ambro’s majority opinion for
the Court in most respects, but I would hold that the parties’ re-
insurance treaties evince a clear intent to adopt the vacatur
standards of the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part III(B) of the
Court’s opinion.
I.
What divides the panel is a disagreement over which
body of law governs judicial review of the disputed arbitration
award – whether it be the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16, or the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act
(“PUAA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 7301-7320. The
difference between the scope of judicial review of an arbitration
award pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act and the scope of
review available under Pennsylvania law has commanded the
2attention of this court for over 40 years, ever since 1969, when
I authored the primary opinion of the Court in Ludwig Honold
Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969)
(comparing vacatur standards of the FAA with those of PUAA’s
statutory predecessor). The FAA standards still rigorously limit
judicial intervention, requiring challengers to show the award
was “completely irrational,” a near prohibitive burden. Mut.
Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co., 868
F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1989); see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)-(4).
Under the PUAA, by contrast, a court may modify or correct an
award that is “contrary to law.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§
7301(d)(2) & 7314(a).
The determination of applicable law turns on whether the
arbitration provisions of the parties’ reinsurance treaties evince
a “clear intent” to impose the vacatur standards of the PUAA
over the presumptively applicable standards of the FAA. See
Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir.
2001). As we explained in Roadway, this “clear intent” standard
is intended to protect parties’ rights to contract for applicable
law:
[T]he rule we announce will preserve and
facilitate the ability of parties to contract around
the default federal standards. Sophisticated parties
(i.e., those who employ experienced lawyers to
draft their contracts) will soon learn that a generic
choice-of-law clause is not enough. Assuming
that both parties genuinely wish to be governed
3by standards other than the FAA’s, requiring
something more will impose minuscule
transaction costs. It is not particularly difficult, for
example, to provide that “any controversy shall be
settled by arbitration in accordance with the terms
of the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act.” 
Id. at 297 (emphases in original). As a general matter, applying
the “clear intent” standard so strictly as to functionally preclude
parties from contracting for non-FAA standards is contrary to
Roadway’s attempt to fashion a rule protecting parties’ right to
determine the substantive law governing arbitration of their
disputes and judicial enforcement vel non of any arbitral award.
As the Supreme Court explained, 
[a]rbitration under the Act is a matter of consent,
not coercion, and parties are generally free to
structure their arbitration agreements as they see
fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues
which they will arbitrate . . . so too may they
specify by contract the rules under which that
arbitration will be conducted. Where, as here, the
parties have agreed to abide by state rules of
arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the
terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the
goals of the FAA.
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (citation omitted).
4On my reading, the language of the treaties “suggested
that the parties intended to be bound by standards borrowed
from state law,” Roadway, 257 F.3d at 297 n.5, with sufficiently
“clear intent.” The treaties mandate, in relevant part:
[A]ny dispute or difference between the
Reinsured and the Reinsurers relating to the
interpretation or performance of this Agreement
. . . or any transaction under this Agreement . . .
shall be submitted to binding arbitration . . . in
accordance with the rules and procedures
established by the [PUAA]. 
(J.A. 141) (emphasis added.) The language of the arbitration
provision is specific and unambiguous, and it evinces an intent
by the parties to “abide by state rules of arbitration.” Volt, 489
U.S. at 479. The PUAA contains rules of judicial vacatur. See
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7314(a) (“General rule – (1) On
application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where . .
. “) (emphasis added). Consequently, when the parties
contracted to have “any dispute or difference” between them
governed by arbitration in accordance with the “rules and
procedures” of the PUAA, they successfully demonstrated a
clear intent to adopt, inter alia, the vacatur rules of the PUAA.
Although I agree with the majority’s characterization of the
arbitration clause as concerned largely with the execution of the
arbitration itself, that is insufficient to render null and void the
clear mandate of the contractual language, incorporating the
PUAA, which includes a specific provision detailing when a
     18This is of particular necessity when one party to a contract
resides and conducts business almost exclusively outside of the
United States. This likely explains why the service-of-suit clause
specifically subjects the London-based Reinsurers – and not the
Reinsured – to the jurisdiction of any court of competent
jurisdiction in the United States.
     19An argument that contains a conclusion that does not
necessarily follow from the premises offered in its support.
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court may “vacate an award.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7314(a).
I also cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the
service-of-suit clause can be read to abrogate the arbitration
clause’s wholesale adoption, by plain language, of the “rules and
procedures” of the PUAA. (J.A. 141.) A service-of-suit clause
is a mechanism to assist implementation of an arbitration award
by establishing a judicial forum for the enforcement of the
award.18 Service-of-suit clauses are profoundly distinct from
choice-of-law clauses, and I cannot adopt the majority’s stretch
of the canons of logical inference to conclude that a service-of-
suit clause, without more, may dictate the choice of substantive
law by omitting an affirmative declaration of what standard
should govern judicial review of arbitral awards. This qualifies,
I believe, as the fallacy of non sequitur.19 Our Court has recently
rejected just such an attempt to interpret a service-of-suit clause
to mandate the form of dispute-resolution: “[s]ervice-of-suit
clauses do not negate accompanying arbitration clauses; indeed,
they may complement arbitration clauses by establishing a
6judicial forum in which a party may enforce arbitration.”
Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London,
Subscribing to Retrocessional Agreement Nos. 950548, 950549,
& 950646, 584 F.3d 513, 554 (3d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
Service-of-suit clauses are simply not intended, nor are they
designed, to select governing substantive law, absent the
inclusion of an affirmative choice-of-law provision.
Accordingly, the failure of the clause in question to explicitly
adopt the PUAA’s vacatur standards does not even suggest,
much less compel, a finding that the parties’ contractual
adoption of the “rules and procedures” of the PUAA to govern
arbitration of “any dispute or difference” excepts the rules for
judicial review of contested awards. (J.A. 141, 142.)
II.
In my view, the plain language of the arbitration
provision demonstrates a sufficiently clear intent to impose all
the rules and procedures of the PUAA, including the vacatur
rules, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 7302(d)(2) & 7314(a). I would
remand these proceedings to the District Court for
reconsideration of the Motion to Vacate under the vacatur
provisions of the PUAA. For the foregoing reasons, I
respectfully dissent from the reasoning and conclusion of Part
III(B) of the Court’s opinion.  
